Wednesday 25 January 2017

Low B2B engagements prime hurdle for optimising Indo-Bangla economic ties

Pratim Ranjan Bose

(This is a speech I delivered at the “International Conference on Indo-Bangladesh Multi-Sectoral Coperation” on January 24, 2017 at the Indira Gandhi National Centre for Arts in Delhi. The conference was organised by the Institute of Social and Cultural Studies, Kolkata. Special thanks to Asjadul Kibria, Planning Editor, The Financial Express, Dhaka for providing the FDI data. Reproduction of the speech in parts of full with due credit is welcome. )

All are aware of the political relationship between People’s Republic of China or China as we know it and, the island nation of the Republic of China better known as Taiwan.
Taiwan was created in 1949 about the same time as subcontinent India was divided. Beijing considers Taiwan a renegade State. The two nations entered a broad economic framework agreement in 2010. But an FTA couldn’t be reached due to mutual distrust.
Parallel to this, China and Taiwan witnessed ballooning trade and cross-investment since 1990. A staggering 93,000 Chinese companies invested in Taiwan. In return, Taiwan invested over $34 billion in China in the last decade.
Overall, China accounted for 30percent of Taiwan’s $318 billion exports in 2014.
There is an important takeaway from this example before we analyse India-Bangladesh relationship. Economic ties depend on B2B relations. G2G relations can be a facilitator but it is no insurance for optimising the relationship.
Plenary Session on Indo-Bangladesh Economic Cooperation: Challenges and Opportunities chaired by India's textiles minister, Smriti Zubin Irani. 


India-Bangladesh

It has been more than seven years that India-Bangladesh G2G relationship is on a roll. Both the countries have taken a host of measures to integrate the economies. India pulled down tax barriers in 2011, initiated electricity trade in 2013 and, offered assistance to Bangladesh to improve transport infrastructure.
Bangladesh on its part granted India transit to the North Eastern States and reviving a gross majority of the pre- 1965 logistics options that should make movement between the two sides more cost and time efficient in the future.
Apparently, such all-round cooperation impacted bilateral trade.
From $3.5 billion in 2009-10 trade increased to a little over $ 6 billion in 2015-16. Indian exports to Bangladesh increased by nearly $2.2 billion and Bangladesh’s exports to India, though much less in comparison, more than doubled from $305 million to $689 million.
From the Indian perspective, Bangladesh is today its largest trade partner in SAARC. It is also the ninth largest importer of Indian goods. For Bangladesh, India is the second largest trade partner after China.
On the flipside, after the initial spurt, the trade is stagnating at a little over $ 6 billion since 2013-14. In fact, it had been marginally down from the peak of $6.5 billion in 2013-14.
This is irrespective of the fact that the scope of G2G cooperation further increased over the last years. Also, Bangladesh’s overall trade increased during the period.

So what’s wrong with the Indo-Bangladesh trade?

Many argue trade slowed down as Bangladesh is a small economy with limited capacity to consume and supply.
Some also point out that the widened trade regime hasn’t gone in Bangladesh’s favour. Many blame India for imposing non-tariff measures or NTMs, restricting Bangladeshi exports below potential.
The argument about one-sided trade lacks economic logic. India has a $80 billion, deficit trade with China. The importance of trade lies in economic value addition.
For example, cotton yarn and raw material imported from India helps Bangladesh earn $30 billion export revenue from readymade garments. The problem is: the value chain is weak beyond textiles.
NTMs do exist but I think the emphasis is exaggerated.
There is a lackadaisical approach from Indian bureaucracy to address some of the issues like absence of a food quarantine and testing facility in the entire East and North East beyond Kolkata.
It hurts Tripura - a big time consumer of fish and dried fish from Bangladesh. But it didn’t stop the trade of dried fish. Tripura keeps a blind eye to the ‘illegal’ entry of unchecked food items through the border huts.
Many allegations are baseless as well. For example, Indian food regulatory authority has set some standards as per global norms. And loads of food items are imported through this channel. Can Bangladesh seek an exception? 
To summarise, I don’t think NTMs are the real stumbling block before India-Bangladesh trade.
NTMs did and would exist in every country perspective, but trade interests from either side work behind the screen to iron them out. Whether it is India-China or China-Vietnam trade is nothing is free from this vices. Yet they thrive on B2B interests. 

Limited business interest is key

I presume Indo-Bangla trade suffers from limited interest from business communities on either side. A couple of examples will prove this point.
Consider this, the biggest chunk of bilateral trade takes place by road through Petrapole-Benapole and is almost fully non-containerised. This is irrespective of the fact that Indian side is connected by rail and road movement is not only costlier but subjected to huge rent-seeking activities on either side. 
At the Indian side, export consignments to Bangladesh are delayed for days, five km from the border, at Bongaon at the pretext of traffic management.
Ideally, the cargo should be containerised and move from road to rail for cost-effectiveness. The Indian side of the ICP is connected by rail as well. This is exactly what is happening in India-Nepal trade through Birgunj.
But Indo-Bangla trade remains an exception. There is a complete lack of interest in using rail facility at Petrapole.
On the other hand, there is a definite interest to keep the prevailing practices going. No one from Bangladesh lodged a protest against rent seeking etc at a recent consultative meeting with stakeholders organised by CUTS International.  
There is a existing broad gauge connectivity between Kolkata and Dhaka through Gede-Darshana used for running passenger trains. Can anyone answer why trade doesn’t demand using the infrastructure for goods movement?
The puzzle may be answered from the low footprint of Bangladeshi garments business in India.
Six years after the collapse of the duty barrier, Bangladesh’s RMG exports to India is limited to only $136 million (out of $30 billion). Some economists point out that the unbranded garments (where Bangladesh operates) market in India is overcrowded.
Fair enough but, India is a destination for brands - both home-grown and foreign. Why don’t I find many Indian brands, excepting Wills Lifestyle, outsourcing garments from Bangladesh? Why Bangladeshi ethnic brands like ‘Aarong’ don’t expand their network here.
The answer is, biggies in Bangladesh are focussed at the US and European market. They are yet to cross the “psychological barrier” and take interest in a large growing market next door.
The task of market making is left with smaller entities who have limited ability to take risks and adjust to the Indian systems and standards.
Naturally issues like ‘Liliput’ – an Indian company that went bankrupt failing to fulfil its payment obligations – grow out of proportion and everyone talks more about “problems” in doing business in India than focussing on prospects.
Noteworthy, you wouldn’t hear so many complaints in public forums in areas where big Bangladeshi businesses are involved like Nitol-Niloy group – the dealer of Tata trucks and buses – or PRAN Foods that is investing in India.
They work under the radar to make way. That is how big business works across the world. The problem is there are few such examples in the bilateral space at this juncture.

Weak flow of investments

Trade without cross investments is a low value generating activity with limited interests from either side. I think India-Bangladesh ties are suffering from that.
Ideally, as a small nation with a limited industrial base, Bangladesh should ride the Indian growth story.
Bangladeshi business should pick stake in the Indian market. And, Indian businesses should use Bangladesh’s LDC status and zero-duty import advantage (to India) to make it a production hub.  Both are not happening to the desired extent.
India has a strong private sector investing worldwide. According to a CUTS International working paper, India’s outward FDI increased dramatically since 2004-05 and share of developing economies increased from barely 1 percent to anywhere between 5-6 percent.
Many African countries like Nigeria saw a dramatic rise in Indian FDI during the period. Bangladesh had its opportunity when Tata Group announced a major project but the bus was eventually missed.

Indian FDI in Bangladesh
Year
Net Inflow of FDI from India to Bd (in million US$)
2001
2.08
2002
4.3
2003
3.63
2004
6.8
2005
2.67
2006
6.09
2007
1.67
2008
11.29
2009
7.99
2010
43.19
2011
25.74
2012
28.43
2013
45.01
2014
70.59
2015
102.7
2016 (Jan-Sep)
52.79

Source: Bangladesh Bank

According to Care Rating, between 2009-10 and 2012-13 Indian companies invested over $ 50 billion overseas. Bangladesh got barely 142 million (Source: Bangladesh Bank). Another $270 million is added to this list till September 2016.
The only Bangladeshi investment to India that I remember is PRAN putting up a Rs 50 odd crore processing facility in Tripura.
It means we have a limited sense of ownership in each others growth, limited mutual interests and low compatibility. On a business-to-business scale, the two economies are still working in isolation. And that’s against the basic capitalist principles for growth optimisation. 

The silver lining

The future rests on how quickly the investment flow increases.
The good news is Indian FDI in Bangladesh is increasing at a robust rate since 2013. Since 2001, Bangladesh received $416 mn Indian FDI. Of this two-third flowed in last 4 years. If the trend continues we will see a reasonable B2B interest in next four-five years.

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