Friday 21 April 2017

Bumps ahead for India's organised tea plantation sector

Pratim Ranjan Bose

( My keynote address at the “National Seminar on Sustenance and Development in the Tea Gardens of Northeast India and North Bengal”, organised by Jadavpur University on March 27, 2017)

I am indeed delighted to be present at this august gathering of researchers. Thank you for inviting me in the National Seminar on Sustenance and Development in the Tea Gardens of Northeast India and North Bengal.
As I was going through the deliverables over the next two days, I didn’t find reference to one aspect: the business of tea plantation. I, therefore, will use this opportunity to link the social aspects with the business fundamentals to get an idea about life in tea gardens in the years to come.
As I look at organised tea plantation sector, I believe it is in deep trouble and is headed for serious uncertainties in a decade or so leading to wide-scale disruptions.
It will have most serious repercussions on the life of Tea Tribe or the migrants from Central India. By repercussion, I am not merely talking about job loss but, there may also be repeat migrations as is already evident in North Bengal. In Assam where production comes almost entirely from tea tribes, social conflicts may arise.
The social problems might be averted through rapid growth in investment and job creation in other sectors in both North Bengal and Assam. But the landscape of organised plantation should undergo a major change. Growth in other business opportunities in the NE may also open options for the planters to switch into more profitable businesses, leaving tea production mostly in the hands of small growers.
The profit opportunity in plantations has reduced drastically vis-à-vis risks. Technology solutions that will replace labour reducing production costs and, large scale reform in government rules and regulations may save the day for plantations.
Before I elaborate on the issue, I would like to add a rider. I looked at the issue from a journalistic perspective, meaning there is ample dose of observations. It would be the task of researchers like you to see if there is empirical truth behind those observations.

Tea in Trouble

That tea is in trouble[1] can be understood from many ways than one.
In 2012, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Commerce pointed out that India is the highest-cost producer among all tea producing nations, while the price realisation has remained stagnant.
At the country’s largest auction centre in Guwahati, the average price tea per kg during 2011-2016 was Rs 141, Rs 135, Rs 143, Rs 145, and Rs 140, respectively.
Compare this with normal inflationary pressure, especially on three major attributes water, energy and fertiliser and you know bottom-line is under pressure.
The cash component in Tea wages, which approximately 70% of the production cost, though still very low have also increased. In Assam, cash wages are up by three times to Rs 137 a day since 2001.
The impact of the current price stagnation is significant because it is coming on the back of a six-year-long price crash during 2000-2006. Add to this, increasing climate risks and the industry facing serious headwinds.
Producing quality tea is a solution but only as long as its preserve of very few.
Plantation has no control over retailing which is a domain of marketing companies. Naturally, any mass shift towards orthodox tea or some other variety, which is now fetching higher prices; will be futile. This is why most of the gardens prefer to produce plainer verities and operate at low-equilibrium.
Complaints about lack of investment by planters are not entirely true.
Over the last decade or so, planters in North India paid significant attention to re-plantation. As in 2012, the average age[2] of bush in North India was 35 years, which is reasonable. But in South India, the age profile was as high as 68 years. As an industry South Indian tea plantation should be headed for more serious troubles in the days to come.
It would be interesting to point out here that while its industry went downhill, South India offered a better life to tea workers. I measure this by the incidence of education and upward mobility. Over the last 20-25 years, South Indian gardens produced many engineers and government officers. Such instances are abysmally low Assam and West Bengal.
Another way of measuring the status of plantation sector is by the presence of corporates and their influence in the Indian economy or politics.
I joined the profession in early 1990’s. That was a time when companies with retail marketing muscle like Tata Tea or HLL were also major producers of tea. There were many foreign corporates like Williamson Magor, Warren Tea. Assam Tea was a major company.
Twenty-five years later, big corporates mostly exited South India. I know one company stuck there because they are not getting an exit opportunity. Though officially, 40% of the 1000 odd gardens in the North (including approximately 800 in Assam and 195 in West Bengal) are members of India Tea Association, there are barely two-three corporates of repute and size in tea (like Goodricke, McLeod Russel).
The tea industry has lost the clout in the national economy.
West Bengal suffers from low yield, high cost and very low profitability. Unofficially barely 30-35[3] gardens (out of 195) make profit. The rest are carrying on by cutting corners, which includes PF default or not investing adequately in agri-input. So, future sickness and closure are imminent. And tea gardens once sick never find buyers.
The situation is better in Assam due to high yield, lower costs. Yet as in August 2014, 228[4] gardens, approximately 30% of total, report PF defaults– a clear sign that people are cutting corners.
Except some chit-fund buying, M&A (merger and acquisition) activity is very rare in tea for more than a decade. McLeod, world’s largest tea company has no plan to invest in India. They are investing in Africa and Vietnam.


Government, Tea Board responsible

The root of the problem is very deep. 
First, tea plantations were set up by the English to cater the overseas markets. The model got a new traction through Russian buying during the cold-war days in the 1970’s, when new plantations, like Namsung in Dibru Shaikia forests in Dibrugarh, came up. Probably, the government of the day encouraged it for foreign exchange earning. As in the past this time too, the industry followed the wrong practices of bringing cheap labour from the Central India.
Taking advantage of the Rupee-Rouble trade and captive market in the erstwhile COMECON, Russians used to offer artificially high prices for Indian tea. In Calcutta Auction Centre other buyers used to wait till Russian buying was over. In other words prices in domestic market enjoyed traction in the export market.
The price-traction ended with the collapse of the USSR in December 1991. In that year, India produced 754[5] million kgs of tea and exported 203 million kgs or 27% of total production. In 1992, the very next year, our exports dropped to 175 mkgs. Now jump cut to 2015-16[6]. India achieved record production and exports of 1233 kmgs and 233 mkgs respectively. The share of exports was down to 19 per cent. It was the best year. Generally exports are stagnant at 200-210 mkgs range, for last 25 years vis-à-vis 62 % rise in production.
Increase in production at times of weak price traction is an anomaly. It was possible due to completely wrong policy push by the Tea Board and Government of India. While USSR was breaking, Tea Board announced a plan to expand India’s tea production to 1000 mkgs in 10 years. They also promised marketing push both in India and abroad.
In the end, they were only successful in increasing production. For quick increases, they opened a new avenue called small growers or farmers, operating outside the purview of Plantation Labour Act. To serve small growers came bought-leaf factories (BLF). Both the small grower and BLF remained largely outside the clutches of various regulations governing organised plantations. With low costs, small growers started flooding the tea market.
Alarmed, some organised players took State politics by its side to bypass to regulations. So came “project Gardens” which are nothing but, small private lands taken on lease and stitched together. Plantation Labour Act is not applicable in such gardens. There are 70 such project gardens in West Bengal, all came up in the 1990’s, distorting the price economics.
The 471 mkgs capacity added over the last 25 years is mostly, if not entirely, through this route. The quality of such tea is inferior. But since India largely consumes tea blended with many other ingredients starting from Gur to Ginger; quality is not a major issue.
Allowing contract farming and freeing organised plantation from highly restrictive control-era regulations could have been a logical free market option. That didn’t happen either. Tea Board wouldn’t lose the opportunity to dictate every step of planters. There are even incidences of holding up court approved merger proposals for years.

Over-regulated

A planter should renew five licenses every year and has to deal with dozens of inspectors from the Tea Board, Central Excise, Inspector of Factories, Weights and Meteorology, FSSAI, Employment Exchange, Sales Tax, Agriculture Income Tax, Income Tax, Labour department, Revenue Department, Provident Fund, Pollution Control Board etc. There is complete inspector Raj in Tea. And, that only breeds corruption.
For State politics, large workforce in organised plantations is a vote bank. They are not only asking planters to pay higher cash wages, which is a just demand; they are also forcing too many social responsibilities on planters which are contrary to the free-market mechanism.
During the peak of price crash in 2003, Assam handed over a new prototype for labour quarters that includes one living room, two bedrooms of 100 sq ft each, a verandah, kitchen and toilet. Naturally, the industry failed. And failure means more bribe. The other option is compromising with quality.
As per rules tea gardens are to provide rice or atta at 50 paise a kg to the plantation worker. Traditionally State offered low-cost supplies to tea estates. Assam now withdrew the facility, forcing the planters to fill three times wider gap.
I am sure many planters will even try to manage finances by compromising seriously on quality. Workers are also learning the trick fast. Since there is no AADHAR in Assam, enjoying dual benefits of State provisions and garden supplies is common.


Way ahead

Taking small growers into consideration, who now contribute nearly 40% of production, tea is still a factor of cheap labour and is increasingly becoming so due to expanding share of small growers. Considering market glut, this surely deserved a shakeout of smaller players, opening space for only a few deep-pocket long term players focusing on high-value teas.
I recently met two small but very interesting planters. Both are engineers by training and of the same age group. One joined the family business straight from the college in early 1990’s. The other one was working for a vendor of Apple in the US.  He comes back to parents and entered plantation in 2009.
Both did excellent work over last 10 years. One created a local brand that fetches a premium. Teas produced by the second were listed among the top five at Guwahati auction in 2016. Yet, both are now looking for a slow but sure exit from tea. Since there are no buyers for plantations, slow killing is the only option.
I don’t think politics or trade union is prepared for this. The government still talks about tea tourism, which to my mind is no solution at all. Allowing planters to switch over to other commercial farming, was a possibility. But except in growing creepers on shade trees, they have no other right. Tamil Nadu planters are better off as they own the land.
It is to be seen how things pan out especially on tea tribes. Hard to believe that one-third of the State population in Assam lived in estates without land rights for so long. They have already started flooding the cheap labour market in the region. Any further pressure may create cause for conflict.
Meanwhile, in Bengal Tea Tribes are the worst sufferers of the all-pervading sickness. Unlike in Assam, here the workspace is divided between Tea Tribes and the Nepalese, who were traditionally a tool to the management to divide and rule. With time they have shown right aspirations to control power and resources. Their economy is also boosted by remittance earning. At the closed Bandapani tea estate the Nepali line is dotted with palatial buildings and cars, trucks etc.
In contrast, tea tribe is often deprived of the legitimate dues like old age pension from the government due to lack awareness, low political aspirations and low adaptability.

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[1] http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/agri-business/why-plantations-are-no-ones-cup-of-tea/article9547240.ece
[2] http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/why-mergers-dont-brew-in-tea-sector/article4119893.ece
[3] http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/agri-business/the-wilting-tea-industry-of-north-bengal/article8310079.ece
[4] http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-otherstates/228-tea-gardens-fail-to-deposit-provident-fund-amount/article6354830.ece