Friday 25 August 2017

GST should trigger a chain of reactions in India's socio-economic-political landscape

Pratim Ranjan Bose

(Reproducing my introductory remarks at the "GST Conclave" hosted by BusinessLine, in Kolkata, on August 18, 2017)
I can vividly remember the shock India got from economic liberalisation in June 1991. As I joined the financial journalism the very next year, I saw before my eyes economic activities built strictly on closed-economy principles, drowning in sorrow. We saw big companies both in public and private sectors - like Coal India, SAIL, Tata Steel - slipping into the red. Over here in Bengal, a Leftist government was blaming “open door policy” for all ills.
It took at least four-five years before pessimism was replaced by optimism. Many companies, which slipped into the red, started getting bigger than ever. Many new companies came, in much larger numbers than the closed ones, to exploit the new opportunities. Many jobs were cut in uncompetitive sectors. But new opportunities were created in much larger numbers. Twenty-five years later, today, no one would talk about going back to the old regime when one had to wait for years to get delivery of a scooter or refrigerator and, the makers were reaping harvests of investing in political capital to get a license.
I presume we are headed for a similar kind of scenario with GST, barring some exceptions. GST, as we all know is a consumption-end tax that is to plug the tax leakage and remove the cascading effect of the tax on product prices as well. It removed the scope of VAT arbitrage between States. We are aiming to make noncompliance, economically unviable; as those out of the GST net, cannot avail input credit.

Major reform
Aided with AADHAR based biometric mapping and IT support, this indirect tax reforms should eventually widen our thin direct tax base as a large population who evade tax-net under the cover of cash based activities, should find themselves trapped in. This I think is the most important long term effect of GST or GST-centric reforms, we are witnessing.
But all this is not going to come easy. India for ages built an ecosystem for tax evasion. The humongous election expenses (a candidate aspiring for merely a corporators seat in Kolkata spend anywhere between Rs 25 lakh to Rs 2 crore) of political parties, come at a cost. Tax evasion is one of those costs. According to a Delhi based transport research agency, 50 % of goods transported by road  - including 70% of SME production – avoid the tax net. You may or may not agree with the number but rest assured that a good majority of our trade and commerce evade or avoid taxes, creating major social distortions.
As was illustrated by the Finance Minister Arun Jaitley during the 2017 Budget speech, the number of foreign travellers from India; the consumer interest in luxury cars and other premium products do not justify the thin minority of 24 lakh people income tax assesses, showing over Rs 10 lakh annual earning. Similarly, barely one-third of the 14 lakh companies file returns and, only 7781 companies show profit-after-tax of more than Rs 10 crore a year. Everyone should agree, either privately or publicly, that their personal experiences do not match with these official numbers.

Impact on politics
But this is probably the tip of the iceberg. One of the reasons why real estate is in trouble with GST is, sand and stone chips – two important raw materials – are controlled by mafias who operate under political patronage and never cared for the law. What should builders do now? Sacrificing input credit can increase prices of real estate impacting market demand. Should they turn the heat on politics to formalise the sand mining business? Or, should they take a hit on super-normal profit expectations? Transport is out of GST. But if all goods come under the tax net, transporters cannot hide their income either. What will happen to their business model built on tax evasion?
There is another perspective of this story. India we all know is a Union of States having distinct constitutional rights. But such a structure proved inadequate to compete with unitary country structures. You cannot leave it to the prudence of 28 States - ruled by a dozen or more parties, who have an alliance with another few dozen parties, each of whom has a different point of view and interests - to make the life of an investor as easy as in China. GST brought in a unitary tax structure through the constitutional amendment. Should it be an inspiration to bring commonality in India’s power distribution sector? This is important to expand the scope of manufacturing beyond merely half-a-dozen States.
The point I am trying to make is GST should trigger a chain of reactions or reforms in Indian socio-economic-political landscape. But unlike the 1991 economic reforms that had immediate social ramifications; GST is a slow fire that will burn deep but without making it obvious. You will know the result only later. It means, we are unlikely to see any impromptu mass reaction against GST, which should make it difficult for the politics to launch any popular opposition against GST as they did against 1991 reforms.

Some weaknesses
GST, I presume will surely improve our Tax-GDP ratio from a paltry 16%, the lowest among BRICS nations. But, I have doubts if GST in its current format would ensure maximum gains. The multiplicity of rates, the differences in rates between an air-conditioned (AC) and non-AC restaurant, or economy and business class seats in flight; are probably that chink in the armour. 
Such differentials, drawn on the closed-economy cliches; had no reason to survive in the GST era. There was no discussion on these lines in the past either. Yet they made a last minute entry. I anticipate it would open multiple battle lines for the tax-collectors; it would also keep them rooted to the tradition of suspecting business rather than respecting it. Such environment breeds corruption, which in itself is a major hurdle in ensuring ease-of-doing-business. 
 The need was to make it simple but strict and, eliminate the discretionary power of politics. But we decided to go with such powers, opening floodgates of requests and everyday changes in rates of items.
In other words, GST though promises to remove many ills has left at least one basic inadequacy of our tax and tax administration system intact. I anticipate we have to wait for another set of reforms to make economic and political life more Swachh (clean).

Right move
Having said this, I do keep faith in the great Indian resilience. There are criticisms of planning gaps - like not having planned an anti-profiteering authority well in advance, as Australia did; last minute announcement of rates denying business time to plan adequately and the suspense over the e-way bill.
The critics are correct. But frankly speaking, the country that wastes 17 years in discussing and postponing GST implementation; cannot expect the roll out to be as smooth as in Australia. To be fair, given its federal structure, size and complexity; India cannot be equated with Australia either. We will take time to get rid of the Jugad mentality.


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Tuesday 22 August 2017

Belt and Road shadow on Doklam stand-off?

Pratim Ranjan Bose

Understanding international politics was never easy. And, Xi Jinping’s China has made it a little more difficult than in the past. The much publicised Doklam stand-off between India and China for last two months may be another example of the increasing geopolitical complexity in the region.
What appears to be a border conflict over road building activities by China in a disputed territory, at the tri-junction of China, Bhutan and India, very close to India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor; may have great significance to the rest of the South Asia.
Before we discuss the wider implications, readers should be introduced to what one of India’s top foreign affairs and security expert Shyam Saran refers as “The cabbage theory”.
In layman’s terms it refers to a multilayered strategy, wherein “none of the singular moves is serious enough to attract opposition but then, cumulatively, you come to a point where it has actually changed their entire security situation dramatically. It is very hard to reverse,” Saran recently told The Indian Express.
Looking from this perspective the Doklam stand-off may have more interesting stories to tell than it meets the eye. 

India-Bhutan relationship
First, border disputes are not new to India and China (or for that matter between China and most of its neighbours, sharing either land or maritime boundary). It is also not new for China either to claim territorial control, often citing some obscure piece of history.
Even stand-offs are not new in Indo-China border. The last such incident took place in India’s Northern borders. What is new, however, is dragging Bhutan into Indo-China rivalry.
India has an extremely stable relationship with Bhutan, which has taken a conscious decision, years ago, to stay away from the big fight and depend on its Southern neighbour for security. The Bhutanese strategy is in sharp contrast to Nepal with which Bhutan doesn’t share a cordial relation.
Additionally, Bhutan has a long pending claim over the Doklam plateau, which is in China’s control as per 1890 and 1906 conventions between Great Britain (the then colonial ruler of India) and China. Thimphu was not a party to these agreements.
As per the international convention with regard to such disputes, it was agreed that China will maintain status-quo in Doklam, meaning they will not carry out constructions beyond those already listed or agreed. China violated the status quo by attempting highway construction in June – probably with a clear purpose in mind.
India had only two options.
India could either ignore such unilateral actions by Beijing, thereby failing Bhutan and undermining its own security interests vis-a-vis the Siliguri Corridor (that keeps North Eastern states connected to the rest of the India; or, could prevent disruption of status quo in the first instance.
As Delhi preferred the second option, China has now let loose its propaganda machinery to showcase the incident as an act of unilateralism on the part of India and threatening dire consequences. There is sufficient scope of assuming the Chinese reaction is scripted.
This is a war of nerves. The immediate aim is put pressure on Bhutan to give up its alliance with India and make Delhi vulnerable both on security and geopolitical front.

CPEC a reason?
No one knows what will happen next.
Chinese State media has nearly declared a war. There were some provocative comments from Chinese officials too. However, on the ground, China is maintaining status quo, except a recent report of “incursion bid” at Ladakh, which might again be diversionary tactics.
India has so far done well in maintaining calm, in the face of provocations. Delhi’s position has also drawn global attention. Japan became the first G-7 country to support India by indirectly criticising China for breaking the status quo. 
Meanwhile, the cabbage theorists are looking for a much deeper answer to the China’s action at Doklam. “China, India border dispute bubbles over once more, but no one is quite sure why”, wrote an analyst in Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post on July 3.
Strikingly, the Doklam face-off took place just ahead of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington. This is significant because geopolitically, the US allies with India in the region. The relationship gained momentum after the two nations entered a military logistics treaty, last year.
India is also consistent in describing Beijing’s $500 billion Belt and Road initiative as unilateral and opposed the proposed $55billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is slated to pass through the disputed Pak-occupied-Kashmir (PoK).
India was the most significant absentee in the Belt and Road Forum meeting in Beijing, in May this year. “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Delhi said, elaborating reasons behind its absence.
This should not go down well with Chinese President Xi Jinping who wants to build a China-centric Asia and has little intention of treating Mr Modi’s India, with 20-25 per cent of China’s GDP, as an equal.
Unfortunately for China though, India is located on a strategic geography; has its share of economic achievements, as is evident in the high growth numbers in this troubled times; and, despite all its weaknesses, India is an inspiration to the democratic forces in South Asia.
Indian stand on the Belt and Road, therefore, carry wider significance and, China is aware of that. 

Wider significance
Interestingly, Sri Lanka that attended the Beijing Belt and Road meet also supported the Indian stand on Belt and Road.
“Unfortunately, the issue (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) is going through the heart of Indian interests,” Sarath Amanugama, Sri Lanka’s Minister on Special Assignment was quoted saying in The Hindu on May 16, 2017, soon after the Beijing meeting. 
Sri Lanka, it may be mentioned, is a case-study for the world on how China’s money-bag diplomacy can put smaller nations under serious debt trap, leading to selling of infrastructure (Hambantota Port) to the China.
The topic attracted attention in India’s Eastern neighbour Bangladesh, where China recently offered $20-24 billion assistance.
In a study titled “State of Bangladesh Economy in FY 2016-17”, the Dhaka-based Centre for Policy Dialogue briefly mentioned that Chinese (and Russian) finance might prove costly to Bangladesh. China is also keen that Dhaka converts the soft loans into commercial loan.
The point is, while no one can deny China’s remarkable economic success; the country is also held for pushing expansionist strategies and, India may not be alone in opposing China-centric image of Asia.
Indonesia made a significant beginning in July, when they renamed their maritime boundary as ‘Natuna Sea’, ignoring protests from Beijing which referred it as the South China Sea. “Indonesia shrugs off China's protest over North Natuna Sea's name,” wrote Jakarta Post on July 18.


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