Belt and Road shadow on Doklam stand-off?

Pratim Ranjan Bose

Understanding international politics was never easy. And, Xi Jinping’s China has made it a little more difficult than in the past. The much publicised Doklam stand-off between India and China for last two months may be another example of the increasing geopolitical complexity in the region.

What appears to be a border conflict over road building activities by China in a disputed territory, at the tri-junction of China, Bhutan and India, very close to India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor; may have great significance to the rest of the South Asia.

Before we discuss the wider implications, readers should be introduced to what one of India’s top foreign affairs and security expert Shyam Saran refers as “The cabbage theory”.

In layman’s terms it refers to a multilayered strategy, wherein “none of the singular moves is serious enough to attract opposition but then, cumulatively, you come to a point where it has actually changed their entire security situation dramatically. It is very hard to reverse,” Saran recently told The Indian Express.

Looking from this perspective the Doklam stand-off may have more interesting stories to tell than it meets the eye. 

India-Bhutan relationship

First, border disputes are not new to India and China (or for that matter between China and most of its neighbours, sharing either land or maritime boundary). It is also not new for China either to claim territorial control, often citing some obscure piece of history.

Even stand-offs are not new in Indo-China border. The last such incident took place in India’s Northern borders. What is new, however, is dragging Bhutan into Indo-China rivalry.

India has an extremely stable relationship with Bhutan, which has taken a conscious decision, years ago, to stay away from the big fight and depend on its Southern neighbour for security. The Bhutanese strategy is in sharp contrast to Nepal with which Bhutan doesn’t share a cordial relation.

Additionally, Bhutan has a long pending claim over the Doklam plateau, which is in China’s control as per 1890 and 1906 conventions between Great Britain (the then colonial ruler of India) and China. Thimphu was not a party to these agreements.

As per the international convention with regard to such disputes, it was agreed that China will maintain status-quo in Doklam, meaning they will not carry out constructions beyond those already listed or agreed. China violated the status quo by attempting highway construction in June – probably with a clear purpose in mind.

India had only two options.

India could either ignore such unilateral actions by Beijing, thereby failing Bhutan and undermining its own security interests vis-a-vis the Siliguri Corridor (that keeps North Eastern states connected to the rest of the India; or, could prevent disruption of status quo in the first instance.

As Delhi preferred the second option, China has now let loose its propaganda machinery to showcase the incident as an act of unilateralism on the part of India and threatening dire consequences. There is sufficient scope of assuming the Chinese reaction is scripted.

This is a war of nerves. The immediate aim is put pressure on Bhutan to give up its alliance with India and make Delhi vulnerable both on security and geopolitical front.

CPEC a reason?

No one knows what will happen next.

Chinese State media has nearly declared a war. There were some provocative comments from Chinese officials too. However, on the ground, China is maintaining status quo, except a recent report of “incursion bid” at Ladakh, which might again be diversionary tactics.

India has so far done well in maintaining calm, in the face of provocations. Delhi’s position has also drawn global attention. Japan became the first G-7 country to support India by indirectly criticising China for breaking the status quo. 

Meanwhile, the cabbage theorists are looking for a much deeper answer to the China’s action at Doklam. “China, India border dispute bubbles over once more, but no one is quite sure why”, wrote an analyst in Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post on July 3.

Strikingly, the Doklam face-off took place just ahead of the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington. This is significant because geopolitically, the US allies with India in the region. The relationship gained momentum after the two nations entered a military logistics treaty, last year.

India is also consistent in describing Beijing’s $500 billion Belt and Road initiative as unilateral and opposed the proposed $55billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that is slated to pass through the disputed Pak-occupied-Kashmir (PoK).

India was the most significant absentee in the Belt and Road Forum meeting in Beijing, in May this year. “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Delhi said, elaborating reasons behind its absence.

This should not go down well with Chinese President Xi Jinping who wants to build a China-centric Asia and has little intention of treating Mr Modi’s India, with 20-25 per cent of China’s GDP, as an equal.

Unfortunately for China though, India is located on a strategic geography; has its share of economic achievements, as is evident in the high growth numbers in this troubled times; and, despite all its weaknesses, India is an inspiration to the democratic forces in South Asia.

Indian stand on the Belt and Road, therefore, carry wider significance and, China is aware of that. 

Wider significance

Interestingly, Sri Lanka that attended the Beijing Belt and Road meet also supported the Indian stand on Belt and Road.

“Unfortunately, the issue (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) is going through the heart of Indian interests,” Sarath Amanugama, Sri Lanka’s Minister on Special Assignment was quoted saying in The Hindu on May 16, 2017, soon after the Beijing meeting. 

Sri Lanka, it may be mentioned, is a case-study for the world on how China’s money-bag diplomacy can put smaller nations under serious debt trap, leading to selling of infrastructure (Hambantota Port) to the China.

The topic attracted attention in India’s Eastern neighbour Bangladesh, where China recently offered $20-24 billion assistance.

In a study titled “State of Bangladesh Economy in FY 2016-17”, the Dhaka-based Centre for Policy Dialogue briefly mentioned that Chinese (and Russian) finance might prove costly to Bangladesh. China is also keen that Dhaka converts the soft loans into commercial loan.

The point is, while no one can deny China’s remarkable economic success; the country is also held for pushing expansionist strategies and, India may not be alone in opposing China-centric image of Asia.

Indonesia made a significant beginning in July, when they renamed their maritime boundary as ‘Natuna Sea’, ignoring protests from Beijing which referred it as the South China Sea. “Indonesia shrugs off China's protest over North Natuna Sea's name,” wrote Jakarta Post on July 18.

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