Wednesday 26 August 2015

Low growth in generation, long list of idle power stations, and no sign of demand recovery haunt Indian electricity business

Pratim Ranjan Bose

The last fiscal was a milestone year in the history of Indian power sector.
The generation capacity of the world’s third largest electricity market grew by a record 9.6 per cent, much ahead of China’s 4 per cent and 0.7 per cent of the US.
The growth was driven by the mammoth thermal power capacity addition programme, initiated by the former UPA government (and is continued by the current Narendra Modi government in Delhi), that ended up pushing the share of coal based electricity to 74 per cent in 2014, higher than China’s 72 per cent (down from 79 per cent in 2011).
But, the achievement will look pale if compared against the generation records.
In the peak summer months of April-June 2015 coal-fired electricity generation has gone up by a mere two per cent that too riding on distress sale  by private producers (IPP), accounting for one-third of India’s coal-based electricity capacity of 160671 MW.

Distress sale of electricity

The reasons behind the distress sale of electricity are simple, as against a projected 80 per cent (or more) capacity utilisation to break-even; IPPs record a mere 55 per cent plant-load factor (PLF). In other words, half of the 53,834 MW private capacities are stranded and are hard pressed to meet payment obligations to lenders. And, in a short-sighted or suicidal move, they decided to sell power merely at recovery of fuel cost.
The desperation on the part of private producers had cast a shadow on the capacity utilisation of the Government run utilities, the mainstay of Indian power sector. With electricity available in the open market at as low as Rs 2 a unit, there was a drop in demand for power generated by the government sector that was otherwise considered cheap.
Records available with India’s electricity regulator suggest both the Central and the State Government run utilities recorded a marked drop in generation, during the summer months. This is unheard of in the history of India’s electricity business.
The country’s largest electricity producer, the Central Government owned NTPC (45,500 MW) - that was known for high capacity utilisation - recorded a steep fall in PLF from 78 per cent to 73 per cent over the same period last year. Capacity utilisation of State Government run utilities (58340 MW), is down from 62 per cent to 56 per cent.

Coal stock overflowing

To cut the long story short, India’s electricity generation business is facing an unprecedented crisis. The rush for capacity addition, without creating ground for higher demand, ended up blocking huge capital in unproductive generation assets. The trend was setting in for last two years. The Indian government and the industry in their good wisdom was blaming it on non-availability of fuel, but no more.
Generation utilities were flushed with coal (with three weeks average stock) throughout the summer months, so much so that they are now refusing to take more deliveries. The Government-owned Coal India (CIL) sold less fuel to power sector in July-August, when compared to the same period last year, resulting into sharp rise in pit-head stock - once again blocking precious capital.
A rough assessment says one-third of the additional CIL production in April-June quarter and two-third of the added capacity in July-August didn’t find takers. For the first time in decades, the coal major saw accrual of inventory in first half of the fiscal. Normally inventories are depleted in the first half when 40 per cent of the annual output is produced and demand for fuel remains high.

Following Chinese example?

There are many reasons behind the crisis in India’s power sector and, one can safely assume this storm will not pass overnight. But before we delve into that, a look at global affairs will tell you that stranded power station is no isolated phenomenon.
In the deregulated developed economies, especially in the US – the country that records the highest in per capita energy consumption – plant-load factor remains low. That is legacy of an economic model built on opulence. It has little relevance to a developing country, which is aiming to build an industrial empire riding on cost arbitrage. The Indian case is rather comparable to the Asian superstar China, which is equally sensitive to electricity tariff and (like India) the power sector is largely regulated.
Having expanded its generation capacities in leaps and bounds over the last two decades, Chinese electricity companies have been in trouble for last five odd years. In 2011, China’s five largest power companies – Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, Guodian and China Power Investment (CPI) - suffered an aggregate loss of more than $2.4 billion. This was primarily due to low tariff realisation vis-à-vis high cost of fuel owing to deregulation of coal prices. According to The Time Weekly, 17 out of 24 electricity firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were stressed in 2012. 
While the global commodity market meltdown finally resolved the issue of volatility in fuel prices; the unabated expansion of coal fired generation capacity vis-à-vis slow down in economic growth, coupled with marked decline in renewable energy tariff and a public outrage against pollution put Chinese electricity sector face-to-face with a colossal waste.
As a recent report in Business Spectator puts it, “The old factoid about China adding one coal plant per week, deserves to be updated — China is now adding one IDLE coal power plant per week.

More capacity, more trouble

Chinese electricity generation sector is four-and-a-half times bigger than India. Naturally it would have a much bigger fleet of idle capacities. But Indian problem is not insignificant either.
All of the 19,000 MW coal fired station added since June last year are idling for lack of buying activity. Overall some 20,000-25,000 MW private utilities and another 10,000-15,000 MW State sector capacities are stranded. With another 15,000-17,000 MW thermal capacities in advanced stage of commissioning, the list of idle capacities may only be longer by the end of this fiscal.
The supply pressure will further intensify if the Modi government is successful in doubling the generation capacities (that includes a mammoth 75,000 MW renewable capacity addition target) in next five years. Considering the steady decline in generation cost of renewable energy, the outlook is particularly grim for thermal sector; unless there is a dramatic surge in demand.
The India government is banking on its ‘Make-in-India’ campaign and rural electrification drive to strengthen demand for electricity. Theoretically, they are not wrong. High government spending in social security, over the last decade, has created a huge latent demand for electricity in the rural India that is remaining untapped due to low proliferation of transmission and distribution network.
Almost an entire Bihar (100 million population) and half of UP (200 million population) are not connected by electricity grid, thereby pulling down the national per-capita consumption to a minuscule 760 kilowatt hour (Kwh), which is a fraction of Chinese average (3475 Kwh).
The UPA government wanted to address this issue as a precursor to capacity boost but ended up with limited success. The Modi government too targets 100 per cent rural electrification. Probably, they will go another few steps ahead with the agenda. But I doubt if they will reach anywhere near the target in the stipulated five years.  
The reason lies in the complexity of India’s electricity administration that is a joint responsibility of the Centre and the States. As per the federal structure, electricity distribution is an exclusive domain of the State governments. And, despite at least two rounds of financial restructuring initiatives taken by the Delhi, a majority of the State distribution utilities (discoms) are cash-starved due to prolonged abuse by the politics. To know the extent of the malady you may read my article here
The Centre is now trying to enforce fiscal discipline in discoms by a fresh amendment in Electricity Act, but that is yet to be cleared by the Parliament.

Industrial growth holds key

But a bigger issue, probably the biggest of all, is yet to be resolved: Can India pull up its growth numbers?
The recent slowdown in electricity demand is directly linked to the country’s dwindling industrial growth figures. The last fiscal was one of the worst in the history of corporate India and the latest cut in growth forecasts by Moody’s indicate that the trouble is not over yet.
The Modi government has surely attracted global attention in its effort to push India as a manufacturing destination, as is reflected in the rush of investment proposals. But the moot question remains: How much of it will bear fruit and how soon? Considering the huge build up of idle capacities; the longer the gestation, more prolonged will be the pain for India’s financial sector that is burdened with a stockpile of sticky assets.
A recent report by the Cleveland based Institute of Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) says a lower than projected growth may leave the economy with “$100 billion of stranded thermal power plants running at low utilisation rates and delivering continued net losses for shareholders and banks”.


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(Disclaimer: Graphics are collected from the web. Will be removed in case of any objection.) 

Tuesday 18 August 2015

Naga Accord, regional cooperation and the changing ground realities in India's North East

Pratim Ranjan Bose

India is changing and, the change may be most evident in the North Eastern States of the country, over the next decade.
I am not merely talking about the latest sensation in Indian politics – the draft peace accord reached between the Narendra Modi government in Delhi and the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM) at undisclosed terms. 

Naga accord

Largest among all insurgent groups, not merely in Nagaland but in the region, NSCN (IM) has come a long way from its original demand for Independent Nagaland comprising Naga inhabited areas in the neighbouring Indian States and Myanmar, and is now on a reinvention mode. 
The group patriarchs – the ailing 85-year old founder chairman Isak Chishi Swu and the 80-year old general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah – have been using Indian passports since 2011. It is difficult for Muivah to explain the shift; but it is widely anticipated that the proposed agreement merely underlines the scope restoring Naga rights, without disturbing the existing political map of North East.
The Nagaland Chief Minister T R Zeliang - who is currently sharing administrative control with NSCM-IM, in a peculiar social arrangement – underlines that the accord merely aims to grant “more autonomy” to ethnic Nagas in neighbouring Indian States of Assam, Arunachal and Manipur. 
Implementing the accord will not be free from problems.
The Myanmar-based breakaway group NSCN-Khaplang, that had launched a daring attack on the Indian army in June this year, is opposing the treaty. Khaplang, along with Swu and Muivah, were once a part of the Angami Zapu Phizo’s Naga National Council that entered peace accord (Shilling Accord) with Delhi in 1975.
That’s not all. Nagas are divided in at least 14 major ethnic sub-groups. There are also two more NSCN factions – NSCN (KK) and NSCN(R) – based out of Nagaland. So far, all of them were united, with areas for collecting (extortion) tax clearly demarcated, through the apex body of ‘Naga Hoho’. It is now to be seen, how they react to the deal.
 Last but not least, the entire North East polity is divided in numerous ethnic identities, often sharing an acrimonious past. It is therefore anticipated that the neighbouring States would grumble over granting autonomy to the Nagas as proposed in the draft agreement.

Changing ground realities

Yet, there is high possibility that this round of Naga accord will be a major boost to the peace initiative in the region, courtesy a vast change in ground realities since the Shillong Accord in 1975. 
The home ministry data on violence and terrorist activities in the region indicates that barring the recent ambush by NSCN-K and the poll time violence (mostly in Assam) in 2014; North East has been less volatile over the last decade.
The credit goes to a number of factors ranging from emergence of political solutions (as is most evident in Mizoram and Tripura); a definite move from Delhi in removing the remoteness of the region by investing in logistics; rising aspirations of the educated youth to claim a share of the Indian growth story than spending life of a guerrilla warrior in the jungles; and the emerging paradigm of regional cooperation.
In the first four decades of Independence; India treated North-East more as a strategic occupation without much economic significance. Insurgency issues were handled from the point of view of colonial rulers. And, the high ideals of the closed economy era came in the way of ensuring better ties with neighbours like Bangladesh and Myanmar – together sharing nearly 3500 km border with six out of seven States in the region - paving way for insurgent groups to operate from across the border.
The hide and seek game came under the scanner, once Delhi shifted gear to economic liberalisation, in 1991, with ‘Look-East’ as one of the identified planks to prosperity. The change was evident in the last decade, when Bangladesh emerged as India’s largest trading partner, replacing Sri Lanka, in the SAARC region. The deepening economic ties between the nations created a common ground for Bangladesh to flush out Indian insurgent outfits from its soil.
True, the insurgent groups are still operating from Myanmar, especially the disturbed Northern part of the country, bordering Manipur and Nagaland, where Naypyidaw has limited control. But the recent initiatives of the Narendra Modi government in scaling up economic engagements with neighbours on the East, hold promise for a much bigger change in the regional dynamics in the days ahead. 
The quick counter attack launched by the Indian Army at NSCN-K camps inside Myanmar (in retaliation to the June 5 ambush), may be a reminder to this emerging reality.


A regional initiative

What makes me most hopeful about the success of this emerging paradigm is; it is not an India centric story. An unprecedented regional cooperation initiative is unfolding in the region with India’s North East and Myanmar are at the centre stage. 
There is little doubt that India with its renewed thrust on ‘Look-East’ will be one of the prime movers of this initiative.A dramatic improvement over the last decade notwithstanding; India’s trade and investment in the neighbourhood are still ruling at sub-optimal levels.
According to Export Import Bank of India; in 2011-12, the country invested nearly $ 31 billion in FDIs across the world. Of the total, Bangladesh received $ 72 million (0.23 per cent) and Myanmar $ 10 million (0.03 per cent). The scene is no better on trade front. As against its $757 billion trade bill in 2014-15; India did $ 6.5 billion worth of business with Bangladesh and $ 2 with Myanmar.
An insignificant portion of this trade is routed through North East. Despite making huge investments in road infrastructure on either side of the border, India’s land trade with Myanmar is languishing at $ 50 million.
Delhi is now desperate to change the rules of the game. In the new scheme of things, Moreh has to emerge as a prominent trade point, as India is eyeing a stake on the mineral resources located in close proximity in Myanmar. Huge investments are underway in both India and Myanmar to open another land route through Zokhawthar in Mizoram.
The gains are not one sided. An account of thriving informal trade in the region shows Myanmar is dependent on Indian supply of medicines, fertiliser, cosmetics, high value consumables and many others. A disruption in trade during the recent floods in Manipur sent prices of essentials soaring in border districts of Myanmar.
But the Indian interests are just a part of the larget story. 
The Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam (CLMV) region is now a global investment hotspot. A multilateral initiative is underway to integrate the region with two large markets of India and China through road (and rail) network. It is therefore a win-win to all the players in the region to clamp down on insurgent based in either Sagaing division or Kachin State in Myanmar or Nagaland and Manipur in India.
The economic benefit of this cooperation initiative is so lucrative that even sworn enemies like a Bangladesh and Myanmar are now discussing trade issues. The negotiation is mediated by India.  Delhi has already entered a set of agreements to promote a new trade block comprising Bangladesh, Bhutan India and Nepal (BBIN). In the days to come Myanmar may join this group.
The moot point is, the region is now exploring a new development paradigm that is unlikely to leave much scope for terrorism and extortion tax. It may be about time before some eight terrorist outfits in Manipur and another four or five based out of Myanmar are wind up shop.


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(Disclaimer: Graphics are collected from the web. Will be removed in case of any objection.)