Pratim Ranjan Bose
This is partly logical; partly a hangover of the closed-economy era; and partly, a failure of the Opposition politics to recognise national good. Sad but true, the Opposition failed to recognise the global challenge posed by the pandemic; the post-pandemic unravelling of the world order and; India's achievements.
Traditionally,
the popular discourse on foreign policy in India revolved around Pakistan and
the USA. This time both are absent from the election debate but, for different
reasons.
Indians
learnt to ignore Pakistan
India-Pakistan
rivalry has its roots in the religion-based Partition in 1947. The series of
wars and terror attacks – particularly the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack of 2008 –
strengthened the perception of an ‘enemy state’ across the border.
However,
the sustained rise in India’s economic and political clout over the last decade
under Narendra Modi vis-à-vis the meltdown of Pakistan, brought welcome changes
in Indian mindset.
The
Balakot airstrike (in response to Pulwama terror attack), ignoring the nuclear
deterrents; abrogation of Article 370 from Kashmir and; a parallel drop in
terror attacks across India, brought soothing effects.
Indians,
now confident, learnt to ignore Pakistan. Ideally, that should pave the way for
future cooperation between the two nations. However, the domestic politics of
Pakistan may not agree with that.
The
anti-USA sentiments were clearly a gift of the Leftist-Socialist grip
on policymaking both before and after the economic Liberalisation (1991).
The
highly favourable India-USA civil nuclear deal entered by the Manmohan Singh
government, in 2008, ignoring stiff opposition from the Left, marked the first
major deviation.
Left paid
a huge price for withdrawing support from the Manmohan Singh government. Today,
they are relevant only to the state politics of Kerala.
In West
Bengal - where they were in power for 34 years, from 1977 to 2011; the Left
vote share reduced from 45% to 2%. Yesterday’s ruler does not have a single
seat in the Bengal assembly.
No
political sensitivity about Indo-US
India-US
relations improved manifold under Modi. Both the Donald Trump and the incumbent
Joe Biden administrations in the US contributed significantly to it.
Military
logistics deal between the two nations in 2016 to India’s mega commercial
aircraft purchase order to Boeing; the US Congress’s approval to GE Aerospace
for manufacturing fighter jet engines in India; MoU for semiconductor
supply chain etc - the relationships between the two nations became
muti-dimensional.
The US participation
is crucial for the proposed India Middle-East Economic Corridor. India
participated in the US-led four-nation QUAD and Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
(IPEF). Indo-Pacific is a priority to the US and, India is playing a critical
role on that front.
At a
recent podcast with me, India’s former foreign secretary Shri Harsh Vardhan
Shringla said the bilateral relationship is now above political changes in
either nation. The link of the podcast is available here.
Independent
foreign policy
The
striking fact is, that India chose the US as a strategic partner and,
maintained its policy neutrality as well.
India’s
stance in favour of buying Russian crude ignoring the US sanction and; the
recent rebuttal to both Germany and the US for poking their nose in our
internal affairs; are classic examples.
The
diplomatic row with the USA’s closest ally Canada, is another fitting example
of India’s independent foreign policy.
The
policy neutrality is also visible in India-China relations.
India
recognizes China’s economic prowess. Delhi participates in forums like SCO
(Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and BRICS with China. But at the same time,
India has deployed additional troops on the border to prevent Beijing from ‘salami
slicing’ Indian territory.
Politics
and economics are complementary in nature.
The
neo-liberal thought had put economics in the driving seat. China focused on
building its economic might between 1978 and 2008 before flexing the political
muscle. India failed to grow at the same rate as China in the past, and
maintained a low profile in international politics.
Such
policies are ineffective in the post-pandemic era, where the post-USSR unipolar
world order is collapsing. In the changed circumstances, countries should be
politically powerful to make economic gains and vice-versa.
Modi
realised the potential and pushed India into a high-stakes game. This
is clearly visible on the security front, where India has now started
taking leadership roles.
Changing
security paradigm
The
Indian Navy deployed one ship in the Gulf of Aden as part of a multi-nation
anti-piracy taskforce since October 2008.
The shift
came in December 2023, following a drone attack on a vessel carrying crude for
an Indian refinery. Delhi immediately pressed three warships and allied assets,
into service in the international waters in the western Arabian Sea.
India’s
unilateral steps helped improve the security of maritime traffic through the
Gulf of Aden.
This was
parallel to Delhi’s rapid expansion of naval capacity in the Indian Ocean. The
Andamans and the Lakshadweep Islands are witnessing a dramatic escalation in
naval infrastructure and operations.
The
Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean are India’s backyards. Whatever Delhi is doing now
can be read as a delayed response to Chinese advances. However, the South China
Sea was an exclusive Chinese domain.
Over the
last decade, every country in the South China Sea reported violations of
maritime borders by Beijing. The Philippines was an old US ally. Under former
President, Rodrigo Duterte, Manila nearly dumped the US for China.
India was
barely there in the South China Sea till 2022 when it entered an agreement with
the Philippines to sell medium-range, supersonic BrahMos missiles.
The very
next year, in 2023, Delhi recognised the 2016 award of the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea Tribunal in favour of Manila’s claim over a disputed territory
in the sea. Beijing refused to accept the international award and kept
targeting the Philippine armed forces.
BrahMos
is produced by an Indo-Soviet joint venture and can be launched from land, sea
and air. The first batch of missiles are delivered in April 2024.
Manila will deploy them to stop the Chinese.
Raiding
the South China Sea
The tides
have turned in the South China Sea. Last year, Manila announced an exit from
China’s Belt and Road. President Biden recently established a trilateral axis
with Japan and the Philippines.
Similar to the Chinese challenge in India’s backyard; Beijing is now challenged in its backyard. And, India is playing a role in it.
You may listen to my latest podcast with the Manila-based geopolitical analyst Don McLain Gill, for more insights into the shift in Indian strategy. Watch the podcast here
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